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Abstract 
This paper discusses the conflict between science and religion in the context of pilgrimage.  
Since a scientific world-view rules out many ideas which are traditionally associated with 
pilgrimage, such as miracles and the effectiveness of prayer, it seems that pilgrimage might be a 
practice inconsistent with the modern scientific age.  Attempts have been made to reconcile this 
conflict by arguing that science and religion do not conflict, but are non-overlapping spheres of 
inquiry.  Thus, it is possible to make sense of pilgrimage in a scientific age, if one strips their 
pilgrimage of all aspects to which science might object.  However, this results in an end product 
that is all but unrecognizable as religious in the first place.  It makes it possible for almost any 
activity to be interpreted as a pilgrimage activity, including many activities usually associated 
with tourism, consumption, materialism, consumerism, and entertainment.  Using ideas 
developed by the philosopher William James, one can argue that many of these apparently 
secular activities can indeed be seen as religious experiences. 
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Introduction 
      Advocates of “scientism” argue that science is the only source of reliable knowledge, and this 
rules out belief in miracles, the effectiveness of prayer, and the need for God in explanations 
about the world (Rosenberg, 2011).  Traditionally, pilgrimages are motivated by, and explained 
in terms of, these very ideas.  Thus, at first glance, the idea of pilgrimage seems inconsistent with 
a modern, scientific world-view. 
     Attempts have been made to reconcile this conflict.  Gould defends a compatibility thesis on 
this issue and argues that science and religion are non-overlapping languages that cannot conflict 
because they are about different things (Gould, 1999).  Instead of conflict, urges Gould, we 
should seek “respectful separation,” and “non-interference.”  Science and religion are completely 
different spheres of inquiry that do different jobs and use different languages.  The province of 
one sphere of inquiry includes science, objectivity, and empirical facts.  All questions of 
meaning, value, religion, subjectivity, poetry and awe lie in another sphere.  This philosophical 
move makes room for legitimate forms of knowledge alternative to scientific knowledge. 
     This leaves the project of making religion compatible with science by stripping it of all beliefs 
that scientific thinking would reject.  Unfortunately, the end product is all but unrecognizable as 
religion in the first place, because such a religious belief system would not include a caring God, 
a God that created the universe, nor the existence of a soul that survives bodily death.  When 
applying these ideas to the case of pilgrimage, it involves removing all concepts to which science 
might object.  One might emphasize the psychological transformation made possible by the 
journey of pilgrimage itself, rather than the sacred nature of the journey’s end, or the supposedly 
miraculous facts associated with these destinations. 
     However, this understanding of pilgrimage opens the door which permits almost any activity 
to be interpreted as pilgrimage.  Cousineau, for example, instructs his readers that “it is possible 
to transform even the most ordinary trip into a sacred journey, a pilgrimage” (Cousineau, 1998: 
xxv).   His examples include visiting the Baseball Hall of Fame, paying one’s respects at an 
author’s gravesite, running with the bulls in Pamplona (Cousineau,1998: xiii), as well as 
Hollywood inspired journeys to visit the home where they filmed Mrs. Doubtfire, or locations of 
The Bridges of Madison County (Cousineau,1998: 122-123). It might be tempting to reject these 
examples as an equivocation on the word “pilgrimage.”  After all, pilgrimage is supposed to be 
 unlike tourism, consumption, materialism, consumerism, entertainment, and baseball.  However, 
all these examples of pilgrimage can be seen as lying on a continuum of religious experiences. 
     William James famously surveys many different “varieties of religious experience” and notes 
that they all have a few features in common.  After describing various religious experiences, he 
concludes that they all share two features.  First, all share a sense of “uneasiness” that “there is 
something wrong about us”; and second, the “solution” of this uneasiness whereby one is “saved 
from the wrongness” by connecting with non-materialist “higher powers” (James, 1958: 418). 
     Interestingly, Cousineau describes pilgrimage in just these terms.  He writes that “The 
journeys all begin in a restive state, in deep disturbance.  Something vital was missing in life.” 
(Couineau, 1998: 14-15)  Pilgrims are dissatisfied with something in their lives, and aim to 
transform themselves, or recover something of themselves that they have lost. 
     The “solution” James mentions, is to be found in the union of visible and spiritual worlds and 
can be achieved by “prayer or inner communion” (James, 1958: 401).  However, many 
experiences, other than the familiar religious ones of meditation and prayer, can also be 
described as a connection with a reality that lies behind the appearances.  ‘Sublime’ experiences, 
for example, are vehicles for transcendence.  Sublime experiences are those where on feels awe 
and terror at the same time, and this lifts one’s consciousness out of an individual ego and 
connects to something beyond the self.  Henry David Thoreau found transcendence in walking.  
The 17th century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer argued that music was a way to 
eliminate the distinction between the subjective observer and the objective thing being observed, 
and thus connect with a more fundamental aspect of existence (Magee, 1983:167-169).  Aldous 
Huxley poetically describes how drug experiences can be interpreted as religious experiences of 
altered states of consciousness (Huxley, 2009).  Frederick Franck explains how the experience of 
drawing and sketching is an act of meditation that connects us to the “awesome mystery and 
miracle we share” (Franck, 1993: xvii).  As one can imagine, these examples could be multiplied 
and easily applied to the non-traditional pilgrimage experiences of the sort Cousineau describes.   
     In finding a common core for all religious experiences, James is voicing an early version of 
the N.O.M.A. thesis.  There are two aspects of experience, he reminds us, the subjective and the 
objective.  Religious experiences, James observes, always act at the “private” and “personal” 
 level, whereas science operates at the “cosmic” and “universal” level (James, 1958: 411).  For 
example, religious experiences of “the rainbow,” “summer rain” and “the stars” are not “about 
the physical laws which these things follow,” but about inner, subjective experience (James, 
1958: 411).   
     Pilgrimage is not just about a physical place, but is experienced at a subjective level.  One’s 
visit to Lourdes need not be insincere if one does not believe in the literal truth of the miracles 
which are supposed to have occurred there.  The pilgrimage can have significance at personal, 
metaphorical, and symbolic levels. 
     Mary Midgely has recently argued along similar lines (Midgely, 2014).  She writes that 
science and religion talk about the same topic from different angles and ask different questions 
(Midgely, 2014: 27-28).  She emphasizes the primacy of her experience of such things that 
scientism denies, such as free will, consciousness, intentional purpose, Self, soul, and meaning.  
Her main target is the rejection, by science, of the experience of an inner Self as a mere illusion.  
Since scientism cannot make sense of these obvious experiences, she argues, then scientism must 
be rejected.  That is, the scope of science is limited, and excludes subjectivity.  To understand the 
world, and solve problems in it, we need more than just science.  We will also need politics, 
economics, history, poetry, philosophy and many other methods of inquiry. 
     Scruton also rejects scientism because science cannot explain essential aspects of existence 
such as love, beauty, art, the sacred, interpersonal relationships and the transcendent dimension 
of human experience (Scruton, 2014).  The thesis of scientism is that because science cannot 
explain these things, or else explains them away, then they must be dismissed as illusions.  The 
response being made here is to reverse the burden of proof.  Some concepts and experiences are 
fundamental and necessary to our understanding the world.  Because science cannot explain 
these things, then the claims of scientism are false. 
     An experience, argues Scruton, can be “meaningful even though its meaning eludes all 
attempts to put it into words.” (Scruton, 2014)  As examples, he refers to viewing great works of 
art, or watching the sunset.  This kind of experience is real and meaningful—despite the fact that 
it cannot be explained in terms of empirical evidence, nor proved by the scientific method.  
 These “moments of revelation” reveal the paucity of scientism since it cannot include them in its 
explanations. 
     The phenomenologist, Husserl, also wrote insightfully about the non-overlapping languages 
of objective science and personal experience.  Phenomenologists insist that one can talk 
meaningfully of experiences, such as freedom, and Self, without answering questions of truth or 
epistemology.  In summarizing the history of the movement, Sarah Bakewell writes that 
“Phenomenology is useful for talking about religious or mystical experiences: we can describe 
them as they feel from the inside without having to prove that they represent the world accurately” 
(Bakewell, 2016:42).  Bakewell provides further examples to illustrate this key point.  The 
meaning and importance of music, for example, is best described in terms of the personal 
experience of feelings and emotions, rather than as compressed sound waves and frequencies.  
Similarly, the experience of an illness cannot be equated with purely physical descriptions of 
bodily processes (Bakewell, 2016:42).  
Literature Review 
This paper discusses a current debate in the philosophy of science; namely, the question of 
whether there is room for religious ideas in a scientific age.  These ideas are then applied to the 
concept of pilgrimage. 
Methodology 
This paper is a philosophical argument discussing the problem of the consistency between the 
scientific worldview and the religious worldview, as they are applied to pilgrimage. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
While science seems to conflict with religious language, and seems to render the concept of 
pilgrimage meaningless, the N.O.M.A. thesis that science and religion are non-overlapping 
sphere of inquiry has been defended from many different angles over the last century.  The price 
of this accommodation is to broaden the concept of pilgrimage to include experiences in popular 
culture that have not traditionally been associated with religious experience.  However, one can 
interpret all these experiences as lying on a continuum with traditional pilgrimage experiences.  
 They all and all seek to connect with a larger reality yet describe the experiences at a personal 
level of meaning. 
Bibliography 
Bakewell, S. (2016) The Existentialist Café. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada. 
Blake, W. (1950) “Auguries of Innocence” in Poets of the English Language.  New York: Viking 
Press. 
Cousineau, P. (1998) The Art of Pilgrimage.  San Francisco: Conari Press. 
Dawkins, R. (2000) “Is Science a Religion?” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science: from 
positivism to postmodernism.  Theodore Schick Jr. (ed.), Mountain View, CA: Mayfield 
Publishers, 318-322. 
Dawkins, R. (2006) The God Delusion. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Einstein, A. (1954) “Science and Religion” in his Ideas and Opinions.  New York: Crown 
Publishers, 41-9. 
Franck, F. (1993) Zen Seeing, Zen Drawing: Meditation in Action. New York: Bantam Books. 
Gould, S.J. (1999) Rock of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life. New York: 
Ballantine Books. 
Huxley, A. (2009) The Doors of Perception.  New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. 
James, W. (1958/1901) The Varieties of Religious Experience.  Toronto: Penguin Books 
(Mentor). 
Magee, B. (1983) The Philosophy of Schopenhauer.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Mann, A.T. (1993) Sacred Architecture. Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books Ltd.. 
Midgely, M. (2014) “Are you an Illusion?” NewYork: Routledge. 
Pinker, S.  (2013)  “Science Is Not Your Enemy.” New Republic, Aug 6. 
 Rosenberg, A. (2011)  The Atheist’s Guide to Reality.  New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Roszak, T. (1972) “A Dead Man’s Eye” in Where the Wasteland Ends.  New York: Doubleday 
and Company, 142-177. 
Scruton, R.  (2014) The Soul of the World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
